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This paper studies the e®ects of privatization of a public ¯rm on
the pro¯tability and welfare in the presence of horizontal mergers by
private ¯rms. We show that (i) even a merger with a su±ciently large
share can be unpro¯table if the degree of privatization is small enough,
that (ii) a merger increases outsiders' pro¯t and that (iii) a merger is
welfare-deteriorating.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies how partial privatization a®ects a merger activity by
private ¯rms. For this purpose, we build a model of a mixed oligopoly
comprising one public ¯rm and an arbitrary number of private ¯rms.
Most of the theoretical literature on horizontal mergers views Salant
et al. (1983) as a point of departure. They show that a merger with
less than 80% share is unpro¯table. While their result is appealing from
both a theoretical and a practical point of view, it rests on a number of
simplifying assumptions including (i) linear demand, (ii) constant marginal
cost, (iii) Cournot-Nash conjectures, (iv) a homogeneous product, (v) no
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cost synergy, (vi) a static setting, and (vii) absence of free entry.1) It is well
recognized that the result of Salant et al. (1983) can easily be modi¯ed if
one or more of these assumptions are replaced.
This paper is also along this line of research, but our purpose is clearly
di®erent from that of the predecessors. While most of the previous works
are interested in how the conclusion of Salant et al. (1983) is sensitive to
the above assumptions, we examine how it is a®ected by the presence of
privatization with all the other assumptions of Salant et al. (1983) kept
intact. To our knowledge, there is little literature examining the e®ects
of privatization on mergers in a context of a mixed oligopoly. Barcena-
Ruiz and Garzon (2003) are the ¯rst to address this issue. Assuming a
di®erentiated mixed duopoly based on an approach of Matsumura (1998)
and Matsumura and Kanda (2005), they show that two parameters, one of
which measures product di®erentiation and the other of which measures the
degree of privatization, play an important role for the decision to merge.
On the other hand, assuming away product di®erentiation, Coloma (2006)
compares welfare levels in the cases with and without merger. Mendez-
Naya (2008) proves a possibility of gains from merger in a mixed oligopoly
model with an arbitrary number of private ¯rms.2)
While these papers substantially contribute to the literature, there is
a room for a further analysis. This paper attempts to ful¯ll this gap in
part. First, we allow for an arbitrary number of insider and outsider ¯rms
whereas Barcena-Ruiz and Coloma (2003) focus on a duopoly and Mendez-
Naya (2008) presumes that only one private ¯rm merges with the public
1) See Footnote 4 in Qiu and Zhou (2005, p. 39) for the literature relaxing (ii)-
(v). Moreover, Fauli-Oller (1997) relaxes (i), Dockner and Gaunersdorfer (2001)
and Benchekroun (2003) (vi), and Davidson and Mukherjee (2007) (vii) to revisit
Salant et al.'s (1983) proposition.
2) Note that Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2003) assume only one private ¯rm.
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¯rm, i.e., the number of insiders is ¯xed to two. Second, we assume con-
stant marginal cost where these authors assume a quadratic cost, namely,
increasing marginal cost.3) This simpli¯cation not only allows us to avoid
numerical simulation but also makes our analysis comparable to Salant et
al. (1983). Indeed, our analysis straightforwardly reduces to Salant et al.'s
(1983) once one assumes away privatization in our model. Third, this pa-
per is interested in the merger comprising only private ¯rms, which also
di®erentiates us from the existing literature focusing on the merger which
involves the public ¯rm.
The paper is structured as follows. Building a basic model, Section
2 brie°y describes a pre-merger equilibrium and Section 3 a post-merger
equilibrium. Then, Section 4 investigates how partial privatization in°u-
ences merger pro¯tability. Section 5 further examines the e®ect of a merger
on outsiders' pro¯t and welfare in the presence of a public ¯rm. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 A Pre-Merger Equilibrium
As a preliminary, this section brie°y sketches the equilibrium before a
merger. In order to make our argument as parallel to Salant et al. (1983) as
possible, let us consider a canonical model of oligopoly with linear demand
and constant marginal cost. The inverse demand function is linear and
given by p = a¡X; a > 0 where p andX are the price and industry output,
respectively. There are potentially three types of ¯rms: (i) one public ¯rm
(indexed 0), (ii) m ¸ 1 ¯rms participating in the merger (represented by
i), and (iii) n ¸ 1 outside ¯rms (represented by j). All of these ¯rms share
the identical cost given by cx; a > c ¸ 0, where c is a marginal cost and x
is an output.
3) Most of the literature on mixed oligopoly commonly assumes increasing marginal
cost.
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While m + n private ¯rms maximize pro¯ts, the public ¯rm maximizes
the weighted sum of pro¯t ¼0 and welfare U by following the formulation
of Matsumura (1998) and Matsumura and Kanda (2005):4)
µ¼0 + (1¡ µ)U
= µ¼0 + (1¡ µ)

X2
2
+ ¼0 +
X
¼i +
X
¼j

= ¼0 + (1¡ µ)

X2
2
+
X
¼i +
X
¼j

; µ 2 [0; 1]; (1)
where X2=2 gives consumer surplus and ¼i and ¼j are the pro¯t of private
¯rms. The pro¯t of each ¯rm is de¯ned by
¼0 = (a¡ c¡X)x0 (2)
¼i = (a¡ c¡X)xi (3)
¼j = (a¡ c¡X)xj : (4)
The public ¯rm chooses x0 to maximize (1) whereas each private ¯rm
maximizes (3) and (4) in a Cournot-Nash fashion. Then, straightforward
manipulations yield the equilibrium outputs and pro¯ts as follows.
x0 =
a¡ c
µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1
; xi = xj =
µ(a¡ c)
µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1
(5)
¼pre0 = µ

a¡ c
µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1
2
(6)
¼prei = ¼
pre
j =

µ(a¡ c)
µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1
2
; (7)
where the superscript pre indicates the pre-merger equilibrium.
3 A Merger Involving No Public Firm
In this section, we turn to the equilibrium after m private ¯rms merge.
After they merge, each insider ¯rm maximizes the joint pro¯t de¯ned byP
¼i. The equilibrium in this situation is characterized as
4) Strictly speaking, Matsumura (1998) adopts a slightly more general assumption
that the public ¯rm's objective function is a mere weighted sum of pro¯t and
welfare.
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x0 =
a¡ c
µ(n+ 2) + 1
; xi =
µ(a¡ c)
m[µ(n+ 2) + 1]
; xj =
µ(a¡ c)
µ(n+ 2) + 1
(8)
¼post0 = µ

a¡ c
µ(n+ 2) + 1
2
(9)
¼posti =
1
m

µ(a¡ c)
µ(n+ 2) + 1
2
(10)
¼postj =

µ(a¡ c)
µ(n+ 2) + 1
2
; (11)
where the superscript post stands for the post-merger equilibrium.
4 Partial Privatization and Merger Pro¯tability
Having derived the equilibrium outputs and pro¯ts in the pre- and post-
merger equilibria, this section examines how merger pro¯tability is a®ected
by the presence of partial privatization. The merger pro¯tability is de¯ned
by the di®erence between the post- and pre-merger pro¯ts: m¼posti ¡m¼prei .
Given (7) and (10), the pro¯tability is obtained as
m¼posti ¡m¼prei
=

µ(a¡ c)
µ(n+ 2) + 1
2
¡m

µ(a¡ c)
µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1
2
=
µ2(a¡ c)2¢
[µ(n+ 2) + 1]2[µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1]2
; (12)
¢ ´ [µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1]2 ¡m[µ(n+ 2) + 1]2: (13)
The rest of this section examines the properties of ¢. In order to con¯ne
attention to the role of privatization µ, let us rewrite (13) as follows.
¢ = µ2[(m+n+1)2 ¡m(n+2)2]¡ 2µ(m¡ 1)(n+1)¡ (m¡ 1): (14)
Noting that the second and third terms are both negative in the right-hand
side of (14), we have the two subcases: (i) (m + n + 1)2 ¡m(n + 2)2 > 0
and (ii) (m + n + 1)2 ¡ m(n + 2)2 · 0. It is trivial that ¢ < 0, i.e., a
merger is never pro¯table in Case (ii). This trivial result is stated in:
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Proposition 1. Suppose (m + n + 1)2 ¡ m(n + 2)2 · 0 or equivalently
1 · m · (n+ 1)2. Then, a merger is unpro¯table for any µ 2 [0; 1].
?
While someone may ¯nd little interest in this proposition, it is useful to
comment this case brie°y. As Salant et al. (1983) show, a merger with a
small share is unpro¯table. The same is true of the present setting with a
public ¯rm. In this sense, the degree of privatization plays no active role for
unwillingness to merge for ¯rms with small market shares. However, what
should be stressed is that such unwillingness is stronger in the presence of
a public ¯rm. This is because a public ¯rm has a larger share than private
¯rms. Accordingly, the insider ¯rms become more unwilling to merge in
the presence of a public ¯rm than in the absence of it.
Let us move on to the case where (m+ n+ 1)2 ¡m(n+ 2)2 > 0 or m >
(n + 1)2.5) Then, the degree of privatization proves to play an important
role, which is summarized by:
Proposition 2. Suppose m > (n + 1)2. Then, a merger is pro¯table if
and only if
µ > eµ ´ (m¡ 1) (n+ 1 +pm)
(m+ n+ 1)2 ¡m(n+ 2)2 : (15)
?
Proof. In view of (14), we see that ¢ > 0 if and only if
µ >
(m¡ 1)(n+ 1) +p(m¡ 1)2(n+ 1)2 + (m¡ 1) [(m+ n+ 1)2 ¡m(n+ 2)2]
(m+ n+ 1)2 ¡m(n+ 2)2
=
(m¡ 1) (n+ 1 +pm)
(m+ n+ 1)2 ¡m(n+ 2)2 ;
which is the threshold for µ in (15). Q.E.D.
5) Mathematically speaking, (m+n+1)2¡m(n+2)2 > 0 is equivalent to m < 1 and
m > (n + 1)2. However, m < 1 means that no ¯rm merges, which is meaningless
and thus we can ignore it.
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As mentioned in Introduction, Salant et al. (1983) show that a merger
is pro¯table if its share is su±ciently large. However, we need not only
a su±ciently large share of the merged ¯rm but also a su±ciently large
degree of privatization for a positive pro¯tability of merger. The intuition
behind this ¯nding is as follows. When µ is small enough, the public ¯rm's
share becomes large relative to private ¯rms.6) Therefore, even a large-
shared merger can be unpro¯table. On the contrary, if the public ¯rm is
su±ciently privatized (µ is large enough), the story of Salant et al. (1983)
revives; a merger can be pro¯table if its share is su±ciently merge.
It is fair to say that µ is fairly low in developing countries as compared
to developed countries. In these countries, a merger can be unpro¯table
even if its market share is su±ciently large. In this sense, we can claim
that it is more di±cult for a merger to emerge in developing countries than
in developed countries. Proposition 2 is insightful since it states that the
presence of insu±ciently privatized public ¯rm serves as a tacit anti-trust
policy.
Remark 1. In the above proposition, we have allowed for an arbitrary
number of insider and outsider ¯rms. Then, someone may naturally wonder
what will happen if the number of insiders is equal to that of outsiders.
We brie°y address this question. Under n = m, ¢ in (13) simpli¯es to
¢jn=m = ¡(m3 ¡ 1)µ2 ¡ 2(m+ 1)(m¡ 1)µ ¡ (m¡ 1) < 0;
that is, a merger necessarily becomes unpro¯table. In other words, the
degree of privatization is irrelevant for unwillingness to merge.
6) In the extreme case with µ = 0 (welfare-maximizing public ¯rm), the public ¯rm
naturally charges its price equal to marginal cost and hence all the private ¯rms
exit the market.
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Remark 2. Let us look at how eµ in (15) is a®ected by a small change in m
and n. The e®ect of an increase in m on eµ is ambiguous, but an increase in
n de¯nitely raises eµ, i.e., pro¯tability of a merger becomes more unlikely.
This is easily interpreted by invoking Salant et al. (1983).
5 E®ects of Mergers
The foregoing argument has focused on the pro¯tability of insider ¯rms.
This section turns to the other e®ects of a merger. We begin by considering
the e®ect on the outsiders' pro¯t and then proceed to the welfare e®ect.
5.1 E®ects on Outsiders' Pro¯t
From (7) and (11), the ratio between the post- and pre-merger pro¯t of an
outside ¯rm is
¼postj
¼prej
=

µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1
µ(n+ 2) + 1
2
;
which enables us to prove:
Proposition 3. Any merger is pro¯table for outsiders.
Proof. ¼postj =¼
pre
j > 1 is equivalent to m > 1, which is always satis¯ed by
assumption. Hence, the proposition follows. Q.E.D.
This is familiar in the literature. As Salant et al. (1983) and their
successors clarify, a merger inevitably induces a free rider incentive for
outsider ¯rms. In other words, any outsider gains from the merger by
expanding its own share. This is because (i) the merger raises price and (ii)
outsiders produce more than before the merger by reacting to the merger
formation. The same survives the present case with a public ¯rm.
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5.2 Welfare E®ects
Under the assumptions and speci¯cations in consideration, welfare is given
by
U =
X2
2
+ ¼0 +m¼i + n¼j ; (16)
where the ¯rst term is consumer surplus. Substituting (5)-(7) into (16)
yields the pre-merger welfare:
Upre =
[µ(m+ n) + 1][µ(m+ n+ 2) + 1](a¡ c)2
2[µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1]2
: (17)
On the other hand, substituting (8)-(11) into (16), we have the post-merger
welfare:
Upost =
[µ(n+ 1) + 1][µ(n+ 2) + 1](a¡ c)2
2[µ(n+ 2) + 1]2
: (18)
Eqs. (17) and (18) help us to ¯nd the welfare e®ect of a merger:
Proposition 4. A merger among private ¯rms always reduces welfare for
any µ 2 (0; 1].
Proof. Taking the ratio of Upost and Upre, we have
Upost
Upre
=
[µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1]2[µ(n+ 1) + 1][µ(n+ 2) + 1]
[µ(n+ 2) + 1]2[µ(m+ n) + 1][µ(m+ n+ 2) + 1]
:
Subtracting the denominator from the numerator yields
(numerator)¡ (denominator)
= µ
¡µ3(n+ 2)[(m+ n+ 1)(m+ n¡ 1) + 2m+ n]
¡µ2[(m+ n+ 1)(m+ 3n+ 3) + 2(m¡ 1)]¡ µ(2m+ 2n+ 3)¡ 1	 :
Therefore, it follow that Upost = Upre in the limiting case with µ = 0 and
that Upost < Upre for any µ 2 (0; 1]. Q.E.D.
Under µ = 0, the market is monopolized by the nationalized ¯rm which
charges price equal to marginal cost. Hence, there is neither merger nor
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net change in welfare. In contrast, welfare necessarily declines due to a
merger since its negative e®ect coming from monopolization dominates the
gains for outsiders. This situation in a context of private oligopoly is also
illustrated in Figure 4 of Salant et al. (1983, p. 196).
6 Concluding Remarks
While most of the existing literature on horizontal merger is concerned
with how relaxing one or more of the simplifying assumptions made in
Salant et al. (1983) modi¯es their striking result, we pay attention to the
role of partial privatization. We have identi¯ed that not only the share of
the merged ¯rm but also the degree of privatization is an important factor
for the decision to merge.
In this paper, we have strategically made all of the assumptions in Salant
et al. (1983) intact so as to make our result comparable to theirs and to
avoid numerical simulations which Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2003) and
Mendez-Naya (2008) make. However, we must recognize that our result
will be inevitably criticized since it rests on a number of restrictions as
in Salant et al. (1983). It is our future research agenda to consider the
robustness of our result in a more general setting. In the sequel to this
paper, we will consider another possibility in which the merger involves
the public ¯rm.
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